Abstract. The article attempts to identify the principal processes and patterns, divergences and contrasts that operated during the Independence period in Latin America. These are frequently lost among the detail involved in discussing this period either in monographic or general textual form. The method is to take Spanish and Portuguese America together. Comparison takes place here at a number of levels, not just between Spanish and Portuguese America. The article gives prominence to the regional and social dimensions, rather than to the economic, since this would require separate treatment in view of the issues that emerge.

The argument is that: (1) Independence formed part of a broader historical process that covered the readjustments of the period from c. 1770–c. 1870 not just between metropoles and dominions but also within colonial territories; (2) there was not always a clear-cut dichotomy between Empire or Independence, but many different positions between the two polarities; (3) cross-class and multi-ethnic coalitions emerged in several instances; considerable evidence exists of popular participation; essentially, though, the process of Independence was elite-directed and led frequently to elite-dominated ‘national states’, within which pre-existing social issues remained unresolved; (4) nationalism did not make independent states; nation and national identity would have to be created after Independence.

The process of Independence had different forms and different chronologies across Ibero-America. The explanation lay in divergent colonial and pre-Columbian experiences. Differences in the state structures of empire helped to explain the varying course of independence movements in the 1810s and 1820s. During the preceding decades, ideas and positions within Ibero-America changed under the impact of international events and internal conflicts. The two decisive factors were the transfer of the Portuguese imperial government from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807, and the breakdown of the Spanish imperial state in 1808. Jorge Domínguez’s comment on the contrasting behaviour of individual Spanish colonies is highly instructive: ‘Spanish rule on the American continent came to an end by the end of the third decade of the nineteenth century, but this uniformity of results was the consequence of
a great variety in the process...’ This article aims to identify the main issues and themes underlying these processes, and to examine comparatively some of the principal divergencies. It is hoped that this method will provide a broader and more accessible approach to the period than one-country or regional studies have so far allowed.¹

In the late colonial period the relationship between metropolis and empire altered significantly. Part of the explanation lay in the closer integration of the American territories with the wider Atlantic world. The Iberian powers sought to reverse this trend through policies of reform designed to tighten imperial control. Both Spain and Portugal saw reform as urgent if they were to escape subordination to rival European powers (namely Great Britain and France) and to hold off competition in their America colonial markets. The gradual penetration of Enlightenment ideas into the Iberian world increased the sense of educational and technological backwardness, but led to powerful resistance from entrenched interests. Defence considerations played a principal role in determining the nature of reform in both empires. In general terms, defence and commerce influenced Portugal’s decision to displace the traditional sugar-producing north-east as the centre of its American empire in favour of Rio de Janeiro and the south-east, which had risen with the Minas Gerais gold boom of c. 1690–c. 1760. Similarly, in 1776 Spain transferred the focal point of its South American empire away from Lima, capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru established in the mid-sixteenth century, to the commercially expanding territories of the Atlantic seaboard. Buenos Aires and Caracas increased in importance during the later eighteenth century. Even so the Viceroyalty of New Spain (established in 1535), which dominated Spanish North America, remained Spain’s richest and most populous dependency. With an estimated population of c. 130,000 by 1800 Mexico City was the largest city in the American continent.²


The pattern of colonial rule, and the process of disintegration which followed from the impact of innovation and reform, can provide a working model for developments within Ibero-America during the pre-Independence decades. The alteration of existing arrangements by metropolitan government and its colonial officials highlighted the European nature of the source and motivation of power: they lay outside the American dependencies themselves. At this stage, however, separatist ideologies were not the inevitable consequence. Nonetheless, American patriots, who stressed the uniqueness of the American experience in contrast to disparaging European attitudes, had travelled a considerable distance along the road to constructing a new cultural identity for American peoples by emphasising the authenticity of the American experience. Since this process reflected the perspectives of the predominant ‘white’ Americans of Iberian descent (creoles), it remained distinct from any form of nationalism embracing broader ethno-social categories, which in general constituted the majorities in specific colonial territories. In any case, older corporate, religious, or local allegiances continued to prevail. Many indigenous groups considered themselves to be ‘nations’ in their own right, and were described as such in colonial nomenclature. Creole patriotism would require other ingredients before cultural perceptions could be transferred to a political level. Furthermore, American patriots would have to take regional, local, and status-group identities into consideration before they could convincingly ‘imagine the nation’.

The Independence process consisted of a largely contemporaneous series of occurrences, which took place at a specific historical time and place, for identifiable reasons. These events, however, are usually viewed as a process common either to Spanish or to Portuguese America. By so differentiating Spanish and Portuguese America any sense of the parallels between region–centre polarities (so evident in the individual historical literature of both) becomes entirely lost. Accordingly, the possibility of examining together regional marginalisation in the cases of the Brazilian north-east and the Platine Interior Provinces in relation to the assertive central powers in Rio de Janeiro (after 1763) or Buenos Aires (after 1776)


is forfeited. Similarly, the possibility of comparing provincial movements in Pernambuco and Cuzco in relation to the Rio de Janeiro and Lima elites during the first decades of the nineteenth century falls by the wayside. As a result of this distortion, the monarchist predilection in Brazil and Peru (and the republican opposition) cannot be studied as comparable developments which happened to have radically differing outcomes. Finally, the possibility of bringing together the Minas Gerais conspiracies of 1789 and the Mexican conspiracies of Valladolid (1809) and Querétaro (1810) (both in regions which had taken cultural leadership within their colonial territories) is also lost.

Second, the Independence process is still frequently viewed as part of the ‘national’ histories of individual states, as if the 1810s and 1820s marked the struggling gestation of latent national organisms. This latter interpretation subordinates Independence to ‘nation-formation’, as in the ‘independence of Mexico, Peru, Argentina’ etc., even though such entities did not exist as nations before 1808 — or, in reality, for a long time thereafter. François-Xavier Guerra has convincingly argued that no incipient nations were struggling to be free in the decades before the outbreak of the conflicts of the 1810s.4 No historic nations struggling against imperial tyrannies, such as the Polish case in the European context, existed in Ibero-America. Instead, in the crucial period from 1808 to 1830, two parallel processes were at work: (a) the separation of mainland Spanish and Portuguese America from Spain and Portugal respectively, and (b) the disintegration of Spanish America into many separate sovereign states, but the retention of Portuguese American unity as one vast, Lusophone, sovereign state with divided Spanish-speaking countries along its perimeter.

A marked tendency still exists to view the struggles for Independence as a historical period in itself. The consequence has been that colonial studies tend to terminate in 1808 or 1810, and ‘national’ histories to begin after 1821. The view adopted here is that a broader periodisation should be preferred, encompassing, at least, the century from c. 1770 to c. 1870. Within this period a significant readjustment of the Atlantic world took place on many levels: intellectual, political, and economic. Most individual studies acknowledge these broader structural changes, but do not necessarily make the more radical step of relating the process of Independence to them.

4 Guerra, Modernidad e Independencias, pp. 52, 66, 137 (‘the nation was conceived of as a totality of hierarchical bodies: kingdoms, provinces, cities and towns’), and the same author’s ‘Identidades e Independencia: la excepción americana’, in François-Xavier Guerra and Mónica Quijada (eds.), Imaginar la Nación, AHILA: Cuadernos de Historia, no. 4 (Münster and Hamburg, 1994), pp. 93–134, see p. 114.
Colonialism involves loss of political control of territory and manpower, and, in consequence, the transfer of resources away from the home society to the metropolitan power in order to serve its economic and strategic interests. Yet, colonialism does not necessarily represent domination pure and simple. The effective working of a colonial system frequently requires internal alliances with specific groups within the governed society. In this sense, collusion can become the rule as much as domination. In practice, Iberian rule within the principal Meso-American and Andean territories was exercised through the medium of collaborating groups, such as Indian nobilities (caciques or curacas) and parish priests. Furthermore, Spanish American elites did not regard their territories as ‘colonies’ of Castile, but as ‘kingdoms’ in their own right, equal in status (in terms of constitutional law) to the component kingdoms of the Spanish peninsula. They jealously guarded against any diminution of status. John Leddy Phelan and Frank Jay Moreno have attempted to explain how collusion operated during the colonial period for Spanish America. Behind the façade of bureaucratic absolutism lay another story altogether. Local interest groups even came to regard these extemporary practices of collusion as part of the ‘fundamental law’, a type of unwritten constitution. During the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, this traditional practice ran into crisis when the metropolitan governments attempted to alter the rules of the game and assert the dominant role of the metropolitan state in Madrid and Lisbon within their respective American territories.

The ‘colonial state’ was located within the Americas in the form of the four Spanish American Viceroyalties of New Spain, Peru, New Granada (established in 1739), and the Río de la Plata (1776), and the much more loosely organised Portuguese American authority in Rio de Janeiro, with the various provincial captaincies. This ‘state’ remained a political dependency of the metropolitan government, to which it was responsible rather than to the inhabitants of the colonial territory. The expansion of the colonial state and the ensuing pressures (often in the form of increased taxation and the violation of local customs) began to threaten the traditional balance between domination and collusion. The degree of imbalance, however, depended on the strengths and weaknesses of the

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colonial state in relation to society as a whole. The tightening of imperial
control from the middle of the eighteenth century had a consciousness-
raising impact.\(^6\)

The determining factor throughout the half-century before 1810 was
the relationship between the American elites and the metropolitan state.
With regard to Spanish America, John Lynch has suggested that these
territories acquired a cultural identity of their own during the course of
the seventeenth century, and also attained a virtual autonomy, due to the
weakness of the monarchy. J. H. Elliot, in a similar vein, has argued that
American elites secured effective control over political life at the expense
of the Spanish state during the long period of metropolitan weakness after
the 1640s. In a recent study of Peru, Kenneth Andrien drew attention to
the impact of the sale of bureaucratic office after 1633, and to the closer
integration of local family and business interests with viceregal
government perspectives than in New Spain. During the broader period
from the 1640s to the 1760s American notables gained access to decision-
making positions within the bureaucratic organs, in spite of Spanish
colonial legislation prohibiting residents from holding office in their own
territory. However, this local penetration of administrative institutions
remained informal rather than institutionalised. Accordingly, the elites
remained politically vulnerable to any reassertion of metropolitan
authority. For that reason, renovated absolutism and renewed centralism
during the latter part of the eighteenth century proved to be a disturbing
and disillusioning experience for the American elites.\(^7\)

The resident elites included Spaniards and Americans: provenance did
not necessarily imply either difference of material interest or any political
polarity. The predominance of American interests and family connections
provided the defining element which distinguished this group from the
‘peninsular’ elite, whose Spanish peninsular interests and orientation
predominated. Viceroyos, members of the episcopate, magistrates of the
\textit{audiencias} (the supreme judicial and administrative bodies within the
Spanish Empire), and senior army officers occupied the principal echelons
of this latter group. Bourbon policies after c. 1765 sought to restore

\(^6\) James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, \textit{Early Latin America. A History of Colonial
Spanish America and Brazil} (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 346–97. Nicholas Canny and
Anthony Pagden (eds.), \textit{Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800} (Princeton,

\(^7\) John Lynch, \textit{Spain under the Habsburgs, vol. 11; Spain and America, 1398–1700} (Oxford,
J. Andrien, \textit{Crisis and Decline. The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century}
Ibero-American Independence Movements

peninsular predominance within the audiencias through appointment of qualified Spaniards whose American office-holding formed part of an imperial career pattern. Status, power, and wealth combined to determine elite position. The combination varied over time and space. In New Spain, for instance, wealth increasingly determined social position during the last century of colonial rule. Even so, as Doris Ladd’s study of the Mexican nobility demonstrated, many individuals who had risen through commerce or mining acquired noble titles and sought thereby to stabilise their family status.8

The resident elites encompassed a wide range of economic interests, amongst which were landed proprietors – sometimes plantation-owners dependent upon slave labour, as in the northern Peruvian coastal valleys, the north-eastern Brazilian sugar plantations, or the cacao-plantations of the coastal valleys of Venezuela. Merchant-creditors formed a highly significant component. In New Spain and Peru their investments extended through the mining and textile sectors, sugar-plantations, the dye trade, and various types of estate-production, from cattle-raising or wheat-cultivation to the fabrication of pulque and other strong drinks. As such the merchants’ activities did not conflict with those of landowners, but were usually complementary to them. Many family and personal linkages drew these broad-ranging interests together. Within Spanish America, mercantile corporations (consulados) acted as pressure groups for the powerful commercial interests of Mexico City, Lima, and Cartagena, from the 1770s in Buenos Aires and Caracas, and from the 1790s in Veracruz and Guadalajara, as well. Since members of the consulados engaged in large-scale transactions, handled extensive funds or managed bills of payment, and owned properties in town and country, they also acquired a crucial position in the administration of government finances through the practice of tax-farming – at least until the third quarter of the eighteenth century – in default of adequately paid and staffed fiscal bureaucracies. Within the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, the alliance of consulado and audiencia traditionally represented the nodal point of Spanish power. From the 1770s, however, members of both corporations moved into

opposition to metropolitan-government policies, a factor which further contributed to the destabilisation of political life.9

Old regime protests and new movements

The movements generally described as ‘Independence movements’ represented new phenomena linked to changed internal conditions and to international circumstances radically different from those which had prevailed before the 1770s and 1780s. Nevertheless, much of the old lapped over into the early stages of the new, partly due to Ibero-America’s traditional isolation from external events. Radical ideas already in vogue in British North America or North-Western Europe generally took longer to register within the Iberian and Ibero-American worlds. For such reasons in a number of instances (though not all) the early stages of what with hindsight would become the process of Independence acquired the traditionalist hue which Guerra identifies. Once events began to escalate, however, an ideological process of ‘catching-up’ took place.10

Were the revolutions of the years 1808–26 a continuation on a more dramatic scale of the previous rebellions of the years from c. 1740 to 1783? Changes throughout the Iberian colonial systems affected relations between the American dominions and their Iberian metropoles. These changes in turn stimulated Ibero-American identities, which in varying degrees (according to the territories concerned) had developed since the seventeenth century. The significance of the core period from the 1770s to the 1820s, however, lay in the growing (and sometimes sudden) politicisation of these identities. That amounted to a radical new departure: it distinguished this period from earlier periods in which


10 Guerra, Modernidad e Independencias, pp. 30–1, 41, 44–6, 53–4, 80–3. The strengths of Guerra’s work lie in (a) his emphasis on the ancien régime context of Spain and America in terms of their juridical structures and political culture, and (b) his relation of the American processes to those taking place contemporaneously in Spain itself and beyond to Revolutionary France. Guerra sees the Hispanic Empire as a pluralistic state (under a unitary monarchy) which had historically evolved on corporate lines. The weakness of his thesis lies in the adoption of a model of ‘modernity’ which is frequently difficult to define and internally contradictory (modernising absolutism, liberal constitutionalism, American adoption of the doctrine of sovereignty of the people).
conflicts occurred primarily within the terms of reference of the old regime. This new politicisation presaged a deepening critique of the political systems of Spain and Portugal both in the peninsula and in the Americas. Guerra emphasises the supersession of traditional elements and the sudden entry under the impact of the imperial crisis of 1808–10 of new ideas and forms, which sought in their different ways to alter the political culture inherited from the Iberian ancien régime.11

The rebellions and conspiracies which took place throughout much of Ibero-America from the 1740s to the 1800s were generally not nationalist in perception or objective. In this sense, they were neither precursor movements of independence nor movements which reflected the emergence of incipient nationhood. In reality there were two phases, the outright rebellions of c. 1740 to 1783, and the conspiracies of 1789–1805. Although qualitatively different, both phases experienced a broadening of the base of recruitment into dissident movements, sometimes initiated by the resident elites, but sometimes directed as much against them as against the official power. With regard to their social dimension, they certainly anticipated developments which would recur with equal or greater potency after 1810 during the Wars of Independence. Recent historiography reveals that these earlier protests frequently provided the political ‘openings’ for lower-class action for the promotion of specific goals or for the spontaneous redress of localised grievances. Conflicts at the provincial level, moreover, frequently had broader, political implications, which on occasions affected the outcome of events at capital-city level.12 However, the earlier protests did not, by contrast, anticipate the post-1810 insurrections in their ideological dimension, which remained significantly more restricted. Furthermore, the earlier movements still operated within the political culture of the old regime. Moreover, the international context was markedly different during the 1810s from the conditions prevailing in the five decades before the accession to power of the North-American and French Revolutions. Accordingly, it would not be convincing to argue that the Ibero-American movements after 1810 represented simply a more wide-ranging variant of the rebellions of the decades after c. 1740.

11 Guerra, Modernidad e Independencias, pp. 115–48: as in the France of 1788–9, the Spanish debate of 1808–10 juxtaposed ‘historical constitutionalists’ and ‘future liberals’ (p. 143).

Few, if any, rebellions sought the overthrow of the colonial state. In part, the explanation lay in the evident capacity of the colonial system to absorb lower social-group grievances and offer at least the principle of redress. In Spanish America, Indian communities’ propensity to litigation was repeatedly commented on by the authorities. Lower social groups were sometimes able to turn the colonial legal and religious structures to their own advantage. Such phenomena helped to explain the long duration of the Iberian colonial system, which was, in the main, not held in place by armed force. This element of implied consent at non-elite levels combined with the collusion at elite levels between metropolitan governments, colonial authorities, and predominant landed and mercantile groups to ensure the survival of Iberian colonialism in the Americas. From the middle of the eighteenth century, alterations in the underlying theory and nature of colonial government helped to unravel this complex balance of interests.13

In Brazil, the Portuguese government’s tightening of the fiscal system particularly during the period of the Marquês de Pombal’s supremacy from 1750 to 1777 generated a far-reaching discontent, but without generalised rebellions or significant localised outbreaks. Pombal extended state power further by the creation of the two monopoly companies of Grão-Pará and Maranhão (1755), and Pernambuco and Paraíba (1759), which were designed in part to stimulate the commerce of the far north and north-east. The latter aroused strong local opposition from the municipal councils of Olinda, Recife, and Paraíba. In Minas Gerais, pressure of taxation following the collapse of the mining boom generated agitation during the 1770s. In contrast to the traditional centres of Portuguese power, Minas Gerais grew from the 1690s as an inland province, less easy to control than those of the littoral. New urban centres arose there that were remote from Lisbon and Salvador and contained a mining and artisan population resentful of imperial-government impositions.14

During the period c. 1740–83, the series of rebellions across Spanish America responded to changes in the nature and practice of colonial

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government initiated by the metropolitan administration. In many respects, the Spanish American movements acted as poles of attraction for locally disaffected groups. They subsumed pre-existing grievances and conflicts into broader movements. Causes stemmed from factors of long duration frequently combined with a recent crisis that explained the exact moment of timing. During the course of these insurrections, Spain lost control of substantial American territories for certain periods. These episodes encapsulated the far-reaching social and political tensions prevailing within the empire. The large-scale rebellions of Juan Santos Atahualpa (c. 1742–56) in eastern Peru, the creole risings of 1749–52 in Venezuela, the Quito rebellion of 1765–7, the riots in New Spain’s centre-north in 1766–7, the comunero rebellion in north-east New Granada (1780–1), and the Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari insurrections in Lower and Upper Peru (1780–3) shook the colonial order. New Granada’s comunero rebels sought to legitimise their actions by appealing to a contractual theory of government, though they did not pursue this idea to its conclusions. In Peru, the rebellions were made possible by multi-ethnic and multi-class alliances, which appeared for the first time and would appear again with even greater impact in the 1810s and early 1820s. All the movements, however, revealed a widespread animosity towards the colonial authorities which went beyond the normal fiscal grievances. The Peruvian rebellions of the 1780s took up the Inkarri myth, which had developed among the Andean nobility during the course of the century, and proposed a new political order on the basis of a renovated Inca (though Christian and Hispanised) state, to be centred on Cuzco rather than Lima. A later creole conspiracy led by José Manuel de Ubalde and Gabriel Aguilar in 1805 also took up the Inca motif. A serious republican revolt took place in the principal Venezuelan port, La Guaira, in 1797, led by Manuel Gual and José María España, with considerable lower-class support. The leaders intended to proclaim the Rights of Man on the French Revolutionary model, and to establish an independent state consisting of the four provinces of Caracas, Maracaibo, Cumaná, and Guayana. Between April and August 1806, the exiled Venezuelan republican conspirator Francisco de Miranda attempted, without success, to secure a foothold on the mainland. His seizure of Coro, scene of the earlier rebellion of 1795 discussed below, collapsed through lack of local support. As can be seen during the 1790s republican and separatist ideas, generally given a stronger ideological hue by the influence of the French Revolution, began to mingle with older, more traditional responses to colonial absolutism. In a broader perspective, the eighteenth-century movements formed the beginning of the long period of economic and political readjustment throughout the Iberian world. This process reached
its culminating point in the Americas with the final collapse of metropolitan authority in Peru between 1821 and 1825.15

In Venezuela and Brazil opposition to peninsular domination also extended down the social and ethnic scale. This aroused elite fears of a replay of the slave insurrection in the French Caribbean sugar colony of Saint-Domingue, which would lead in 1804 to the formation of the independent black state of Haiti. The immediate result, as eventually in the Perus, was a regrouping of the white population around defence of the established order. A conspiracy in Rio de Janeiro in 1794 was followed by an attempted revolution in the former capital, Salvador, in 1798, where 48% of the urban population were slaves. The conspiracy extended into the sugar zone of the Reconcavo as well. Some French Revolutionary ideas of democracy and equality circulated, borrowed perhaps from local elite dalliance with them earlier in the 1790s. Although the Portuguese authorities executed only four rebels in November 1799, the existence of a third area of open opposition in Brazil alarmed the metropolitan government. In eastern Venezuela, some 300 persons took part in a three-day rising in Coro in May 1795, which had black and pardo (free coloured) leadership. In an area which contained some 15,000 slaves, among them fugitives from the Dutch Caribbean islands, the rising called for abolition of new tax impositions and slavery, using French Revolutionary rhetoric. Although few people actually took part, the colonial authorities, which put down the rising with the aid of the creole militia, were sufficiently alarmed to execute around 170 persons. Repression, however, did not deter further attempts. In 1799–1800, a black and mulatto plot to seize Maracaibo was thwarted.16


16 Luís Henrique Dias Tavares, História da Sedução intentada na Bahia em 1798. (‘A Conspiração dos Alfaiates’) (São Paulo, 1875). João José Reis, Rebellão escravo no Brasil. A história do levante dos maus (1835) (São Paulo, 1987), pp. 40–3, 66–74: there were
The timing of the outbreaks of the movements for Independence in 1810 means that the metropolitan crisis in 1808–10 requires emphasis in view of its different repercussions throughout Spanish America. The imperial crisis stands out as the central factor which distinguishes the movements of 1809–26 from those of c. 1740–83. The collapse of Bourbon absolutism in 1808 took place in a radically altered international and ideological context. The issue of representation or the constitutional restructuring of the political process became uppermost for the American elites. In the Portuguese case, it was not the collapse of absolutism in the metropolis which determined the nature of politics after 1808, but rather the transfer of the imperial capital across the Atlantic to Brazil. This enabled the continuation of Braganza absolutism, and the politics of co-optation that accompanied it, for more than a decade, and defused any potential for armed conflict. It did not remove altogether the outstanding issues of the relationship of Brazil to Portugal and of the Brazilian elite to the imperial government or alter Brazil's position within the international market.17

**Representation: the constitutional discourse**


institutionalised checks and balances had long enabled Ibero-America to function without formalised organs of representation. Those interest groups which participated in this process were able to grow powerful during the period of metropolitan weakness. The problem of the absence of representative institutions beyond the municipality (cabildo) rose to the surface during the latter part of the eighteenth century. In Hispanic America, it formed part of the American response to the metropolitan government's attempt to reassert peninsular control. In Spain itself, it reflected first nobiliar response to the bureaucratic absolutism of the reign of Charles III (1759–88), and second the evident decline of the monarchy under Charles IV (1788–1808).\textsuperscript{18}

The issue of representation was central to the broader period from the 1770s to the 1870s. This involved the question of both the geographical distribution of political power and its institutionalisation through federal structures. The colonial experience provided few guidelines. Since the establishment of the Spanish dominions in America the monarchy had remained determined to prevent either the formation of any surrogate cortes or parliament within the colonial territories, or the despatch of American representatives to the Castilian Cortes in the peninsula. Both the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies had steadily undermined their respective metropolitan Cortes by imposing extra-parliamentary taxation, and by governing directly (as best they could) through the medium of the ministry and bureaucracy. In the absence of representative institutions beyond the municipal councils, there lay a vacuum of representation at the centre of Iberian and Ibero-American political life. Furthermore, since royal bureaucracies could be neither adequately staffed nor adequately paid, inefficiency and corruption, collusion and extemporary practices filled this vacuum, where perhaps representative institutions might have stood.\textsuperscript{19}

As long as royal policy responded to, or did not conflict outright with, the interests of the predominant social and economic groups in the

\textsuperscript{18} Carlos Corona Baratech, Revolución y reacción en el reinado de Carlos IV (Madrid, 1957). Vicente Rodríguez Casado, La política y los políticos en el reinado de Carlos III (Madrid, 1962).

Americas, political harmony generally prevailed. Elite division or disengagement from the official power provided the chief long-term cause of the late colonial crisis, particularly in Spanish America. At the same time, metropolitan measures helped to incite protest throughout a wide range of social and ethnic groups. This had not happened before. A combination of elite and popular grievances threatened to be potentially explosive.

During the eighteenth century the nature and practice of government appeared to be changing, and the relationship of metropolis and empire was thrown into the balance. H. I. Priestley identified the General Visitation of New Spain by José de Gálvez (1765–71) as one of the decisive factors responsible for change of sentiment towards the metropolitan government in the Americas. This problem was compounded when Gálvez became Minister of the Indies from 1776 until his death in 1787. Metropolitan recovery of political predominance within the American territories began with the audiencias. The Bourbon state was engaged in an attempt to reverse the loss of authority experienced during the period from the 1640s to the era of Gálvez. Nevertheless, the application of these policies was never systematic and the reforms never fully attained their objectives.

The Ibero-American response to this metropolitan neo-absolutism was the search for a form of representation in the American territories that could permanently guarantee elite participation in the political process. The search for a viable form of constitutionalism had its root not merely in the Enlightenment, but more especially in the historical tradition of the Americas. In Spanish South America, the revival of the cabildo during the period of the later Bourbon reforms explained the newly aggressive municipal stance. With respect to the newly established Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (1776), Lynch has convincingly argued that through the 1770s and 1780s relations between cabildos and Intendants were harmonious. Equally this proved to be the situation in the principal cities of Upper Peru, which had been divided from Lower Peru and joined to Río de la Plata in 1776. Thereafter, however, 'between approximately 1800 and 1810, in almost all the main cities of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata vigorous cabildos were in conflict with the local political authorities and challenging them on many issues'.

In Portuguese America, the monarchy pursued a concerted policy of weakening the city councils (senado da câmara), which had exercised considerable local power during the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, Portuguese policy differed from Spanish in that Lisbon maintained and expanded the participation of Brazilians in bureaucratic and military offices, while preserving the commanding positions for Portuguese natives. Brazilians never controlled the internal government of Brazil itself. By such means, the Braganza monarchy continued to govern in its Brazilian provinces through the cooperation of the principal local families. As Spain and Spanish America grew further apart, Portugal and coastal Brazil remained closely tied together, not least by greater geographical proximity. The educated, middle-ranking professional men of Minas Gerais involved in the ‘inconfidência mineira’ of 1789 looked towards a form of autonomy for the province in opposition as much to Portuguese absolutism as to the concentration of power in Brazil in Rio de Janeiro. There did not appear to be any expression of an incipient Brazilian nationalism, since the conspirators only envisaged the creation of a constitutional republic in their own province. Kenneth Maxwell regards the timing of the Brazilian ‘conspiracies’ as the determining factor which led the elites away ‘from a flirtation with republicanism to an optimistic acceptance of monarchy’.24

The constitutionalist predilection revealed how profoundly Ibero-America had become integrated into the Atlantic world during the late colonial period. When the crisis of the Iberian ancien régime broke in 1807–10, Spanish American territories shared with Spain itself the problem of finding a viable alternative to Bourbon absolutism. In this respect, these issues in the Hispanic world reflected those in France at the time of the collapse of the Bourbon monarchy between 1787 and 1792, though without the French Jacobin experience and republican experiment. Similarly, the crisis of the ancien régime and the search for a constitutional alternative to absolutism in France, French-dominated Europe, and the Hispanic world during the period from 1787 to 1814 anticipated later events in the Germanic, Italian, and Habsburg territories between 1830 and 1871.25 With regard to Portuguese America, the transfer of the


monarchy and imperial government from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807-8 delayed the constitutional re-ordering of Brazil until after the proclamation of independence from the restored Lisbon government in 1822. In spite of the survival of the Braganza dynasty in 1807-8 and the ostensible continuity of Imperial Brazil with Royal Portugal after 1822, the former became a constitutional monarchy through the specific desire of its territorial elite. Even so, the absence of colonial traditions of representation at the capital-city levels helped to explain the difficult transition of Ibero-America from colonial absolutism to working, representative systems after independence. 

The Spanish metropolitan government regarded American predominance in governmental organs in the Indies as inadmissible on principle. Until the second half of the eighteenth century, however, it had lacked the will and the means to alter the balance. If the Spanish government had accepted the principle of an American rise to power in the organs of American administration, political developments would have moved in the direction of the institutionalisation of the position of the elites by means of a type of corporative representation in the Indies. The imperial government in Madrid never adopted such a course of action.

Nonetheless, ideas on the subject did circulate during the 1780s and 1790s. The Conde de Aranda’s Memorandum of 1783 appeared to suggest to the Spanish monarch a division of the American empire into three parts, New Spain, Peru, and ‘Costa Firme’ (New Granada and Venezuela). Each part would be ruled by a prince of the royal blood, while the King of Spain would raise his own title to that of Emperor. Subsequent correspondence with the principal minister, the Conde de Floridablanca, between 1785 and 1789, proposed a still more radical division. The originality of these proposals lay in Aranda’s readiness to hand over Peru (and possibly Chile as well) to the Portuguese Crown in return for the cession of Portugal to the Spanish Crown. In such a way, Spain would fulfil its long ambition of Iberian political unity and free itself of territories which Aranda believed had become a drain on the exchequer. Brazil would become the centre of the Portuguese monarchy and gain a Pacific seaboard. New Spain, New Granada and Venezuela, and the River Plate, viewed as the most valuable parts of the empire, would each receive governments of their own in association with the Spanish monarchy. Aranda, however, had been in political eclipse since 1776 and would not return to power until 1792. It has never been clear how seriously Aranda’s suggestion was meant to be taken. Nevertheless, the Memorandum of

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26 Guerra, ‘Identidades e Independencias’, p. 127; and Modernidad e Independencias, pp. 44–5, 53–4: since constitutions had to be worked out and were not part of the historical experience, the process of constitution-making was itself a source of instability.
1783 did have a certain resonance in political circles at the time and during the Independence period.27

The second, more realistic, suggestion came from Victoríán de Villava, fiscal of the Audiencia of Charcas, in 1797. Villava, a peninsular judicial official of acute intelligence and reforming endeavour, severely criticised the basis of colonial rule and the prevailing type of government. His widely circulated recommendations included an elected parliament to govern the empire under the monarchy and a supreme council. In a clear departure from colonial absolutism focused on the audiencias, Villava proposed the separation of the judicial from the executive and legislative powers. These proposals would open the way for American participation in the processes of government both at imperial and dominion levels. Villava recommended that Americans should have the right to send deputies to Spain to participate in the formulations of laws affecting their territories, and that half the audiencia magistracies should be reserved for them by right.28

Neither the renovated absolutism of Charles III nor the decaying monarchy of Charles IV adopted such proposals. As a result, American elite expectations, raised by the prospect of reform, disintegrated into sullen non-compliance or veiled subversion. In New Spain the resident elite evidently concluded that the only way of preserving its position would be through the subversion of the Gálvez policies by means of the very same administrative organs which were entrusted with their implementation. This explains the contradictory nature of New Spain’s political life in the period from c. 1770 to 1808.29

The Representation of the Mexico City Council of 26 May 1771 protested against the Visitor’s policy of reversing American influence in New Spain’s administrative organs. Between 1771 and 1808, the City Council developed a constitutional position which undermined the juridical basis of neo-absolutism. Councillors argued that the Kingdom of New Spain’s historical experience (its customs, laws and privileges) differed from that of the kingdoms composing metropolitan Spain. For that reason, the policy of excluding Americans from senior positions in their own territories constituted a grave abuse. Peninsulares, they argued, were foreigners in American territory. Assertions of this type, repeated in 1792 and 1800, revealed the extent of disagreement between the American resident elite and the metropolitan government. Even so, these sentiments

29 Priestley, Gálvez, pp. 300–2.
Ibero-American Independence Movements did not produce a separatist movement. Resident elites still thought in terms of adjusting the balance within the context of the Spanish Empire and under the Bourbon monarchy. Still less, did a republican movement arise.30

Beyond the municipality, the Audiencia and Consulado of Mexico City, principal organs of peninsular power, formed part of this corporative opposition at that time. In other words, opposition cut across the traditionally perceived divide of creole and peninsular. In the earlier period, from the 1770s to the mid-1790s, opposition centred upon the Audiencia, the traditional institution of Castilian absolutism in the Indies. The leading figure was the Regente (president) of the Audiencia of Mexico, Francisco Javier de Gamboa (1717–94). This distinguished American represented a combination of traditionalist ideas on the constitution with the new rationalism associated with the Enlightenment. He presided over an informal coalition of city councillors, merchant-financiers, magistrates, and clerics – a traditionalist opposition to neo-absolutism, rather than a separatist or revolutionary movement.31

Like their counterparts in New Spain, the Peruvian elites would have preferred a political balance altered in their own favour. They did not consider separatism the best way of achieving this. They were reformist and constitutionalist rather than separatist and revolutionary. José Baquijano y Carrillo, for instance, proposed that Americans should take a third of all audiencia posts and a majority of municipal council positions. Similarly, in the Imperial Cortes of 1810–13 the Lima City Council’s representative, Dr José Silva y Olave (Rector of the University of San Marcos) pressed for the reservation of one-half of all civil and military positions for Americans and for the abolition of the Intendancies established in 1784, the Tobacco Monopoly, and the provincial customs-houses. Hipólito Unanue and the newspaper Mercurio Peruano (1791–1794) deepened knowledge of Peru’s natural resources and distinct characteristics and exalted the Incas. Unanue stood at the centre of a circle of Peruvian residents, both Spaniards and Americans, who spread the ideas of the Enlightenment in the Viceroyalty. They were not separatists.


31 Elias Trabulse, Francisco Xavier Gamboa. Un político criollo en la ilustración mexicana (Mexico, 1981), pp. 45–8, 88–92, 95–101, 105–49. The Consulado (22 members) opposed the extension of commercial liberalisation (within the Empire) to New Spain in 1789 and most of the reforming policies of Viceroy Revillagigedo (1789–94). It protested on 31 May 1788 and 28 Nov. 1793 against the high cost of living, the extraction of money from the viceroyalty, and the lack of investment in the internal economy.
Baquijano and his group of lay and clerical intellectuals opposed the idea of Peruvian Independence. Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, creole magistrate of the Audiencia of Cuzco, argued likewise in his *Plan del Perú* presented to the Cortes in 1810. Vidaurre, who opposed the separatist Cuzco Rebellion of 1814–15, did not support Independence until the arrival of Simón Bolívar in Peru in 1823. In such a way, there emerged in Peru the phenomenon described by Jorge Basadre as the ‘fidelismo’ of 1810–14.32

*The traditionalist predilection*

The crisis of 1808 took place against the background of changing relationships between Spain and Portugal and their American Empires, and within the specific colonial territories themselves. In Spanish America, harmony, collusion and consensus were already disintegrating in the decades before 1808–10, though not always beyond the point of recuperation. Colonial government had managed to survive the tensions resulting from metropolitan-inspired reforms in the two principal centres of Spanish power, the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru. Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal (1806–16) adopted a policy of *concordancia* designed to draw the Lima elite, already stunned by the impact of the Andean rebellions during the early 1780s, into support for official power. This policy enabled Peru to pass through the imperial crisis of 1808–10 relatively peacefully. In Brazil, a combination of elite fear of ethno-social mobilisation with astute metropolitan calculation during the 1790s and 1800s defused earlier rumblings and bound together the south-eastern propertied classes and the Portuguese administration. The policies of the Lisbon government were motivated not solely by the impact of the exposure of the Minas Gerais conspiracy of 1789, but more especially by mercantile fears of accelerated British commercial penetration, which had been a tendency much in evidence during the gold boom. Lima and Rio de Janeiro provided examples of the two most archetypal traditionalist positions in the Independence period.33

Within the Luso-Brazilian orbit, since the 1670s the Lisbon government had increasingly recognised the importance of Brazil and, accordingly,


sought to accommodate the Brazilian elites. The recommendations of Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho (later Conde de Linhares), Minister of Overseas Dominions from 1796 to 1800, gave effect to this policy. Souza Coutinho’s *Memória sobre o Melhoramento dos Domínios na América*, for instance, reaffirmed the Portuguese view that the colonial territories were mutually dependent provinces of the monarchy. His priorities were defence, rationalisation of the tax structure, remedy to abuses of authority, and reassertion of Portugal’s position as commercial entrepôt for the empire. Souza Coutinho believed that recognition of mutual benefits would safeguard against separatist movements. In Maxwell’s view, ‘this collaboration between Brazilian intellectuals and enlightened ministers produced an imperial ideal, Luso-Brazilian in inspiration, which went beyond nationalism to a broader imperial solution, and sought to defuse metropolitan–colonial tensions’. This assessment reveals the outstanding differences between the mollifying policies of Lisbon and the divisive and confusing policies initiated from Madrid. Maxwell suggests that the drawing together of the Luso-Brazilian elites enabled a ‘Rio de Janeiro solution’ to supersede the republican ideal expressed in the province of Minas Gerais. This solution would reach its culminating point with the transfer of the imperial capital to Rio between 1808 and 1821. Opposition from the north-east to the enhanced importance of Rio, however, characterised the period from the 1810s to the 1840s.34

Portugal had become, in effect, the weak link in the monarchy. In a note addressed to the Prince Regent in 1803, Souza Coutinho recognised the vulnerable position of Portugal in the European conflicts of the time. He deplored the total subordination of Spain to Napoleonic France. Anticipating strong French pressure to break with Great Britain, Souza Coutinho proposed the re-establishment of the Court in America, thereby creating ‘a powerful empire in Brazil’, from which Portugal, if it should fall under French occupation, could later be recovered. The alternative would be the removal of the monarchy altogether, just as the French had

34 Biblioteca Nacional (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil): Manuscript Collection: Coleção Linhares 1-29-13-16, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, *Memória sobre o Melhoramento dos Domínios na América*, presented to the Prince Regent (later John VI) [no date] ff. 8–17v. Souza Coutinho was highly influenced by José Joaquim da Cunha de Azevedo Coutinho, *Ensaios Econômicos sobre o Comércio de Portugal e suas Colônias* (first edition, Lisbon, 1794; second edition, Lisbon, 1816), 2 vols.: see II, pp. 120–9, which emphasised the political and economic importance of Brazil, and pp. 147–50, which stressed the theme of mutual dependence. This work was first published by the Lisbon Academia Real das Ciências, the secretary of which was José Bonifácio de Andrade e Silva, principal architect of Brazilian independence in 1822. Oliveira Lima, *D. João VI*, pp. 167, 201, 218, describes Souza Coutinho, Dom João’s principal minister in Brazil from 1808 to 1812, as a Pombalian-style reforming absolutist. See also: Maxwell, ‘Generation’, pp. 110, 142–3.
done in the case of Bourbon Naples. The overseas empire would then fall under British control. He warned the Prince Regent of Spanish designs on Portugal in concert with the French army, and suspected a Spanish attack on Portuguese American territory from the River Plate or Paraguay.35

When the Braganza court transferred to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, as a result of the Napoleonic invasion of Portugal, Brazil became the centre of the Portuguese monarchy, with Rio de Janeiro (a capital city only since 1763) as its new metropolis. At first glance, this transfer appeared to guarantee legitimacy and continuity. Upon closer examination, a wide range of changes resulted, which would have profound consequences over the following fifteen years and would radically alter Portuguese America’s relationship with Portugal. By virtue of the royal government’s presence in Rio, Brazil ceased to be a series of colonies more closely linked to Lisbon than to each other. Rio became the centre of a newly conceived political entity. While this at first reinforced the political conservatism of the city’s elite, in the long run it fostered the realisation that Brazil was a country in its own right, and potentially a nation.36

In many respects, the opposite occurred in Spanish America, which was plunged without preparation into a crisis of legitimacy by the removal of the Royal house to Bayonne and thence to captivity in France. Why could the Madrid government not follow a similar course of action to that adopted in Lisbon and thereby avoid the far-ranging impact of the crisis of 1808? The principal explanation lies in the differing self-perception of the two imperial governments. Early nineteenth-century Spain had inherited Habsburg and Bourbon involvement in the European power struggle, which Portugal did not share. As a result, between 1793 and 1795 Spain found itself rapidly caught up in the generalised European war against Revolutionary France and consequently faced conflict on the Pyrenees border. The situation was compounded when Spain changed sides. The fatal French alliance of 1793–1808 led only to defeat and bankruptcy, followed by military occupation by allegedly allied Napoleonic armies. Dire financial needs subverted earlier reforms and made the metropolitan government dependent once more on credit from the Consulados of Mexico City and Lima, both vigorous opponents of reform. Similarly, war subverted projected reforms, such as the New Ordinance of Intendants in 1803. Still more serious, the Spanish state sought to amortise its debts through the appropriation of ecclesiastical


36 Jáncso, Na Bahia, Contra o Imperio, p. 42.
funds in Spain after 1798 and in the Indies after 1804. Following naval
defeats at Cape St Vincent (1797) and Trafalgar (1805), metropolitan Spain
found contact with the Indies increasingly difficult, with the result that
concessions to neutral traders were authorised in 1798 and 1805. By
1807–8, conflict within the royal family undermined the centre of
government, as Spain faced demoralisation, chaos and collapse.37

The Spanish insurrections against the French during the summer of
1808 spurred movements in America equally opposed to the imposition of
Joseph Bonaparte. The collapse of the Bourbon monarchy in 1808 made
urgent the transformation of traditionalist sentiment into a functioning
political reality. In ‘patriot’-controlled Spain, insurgent juntas in Asturias
and Seville claimed sovereignty over the monarchy as a whole. American
notables rapidly found themselves in opposition not only to Napoleonic
claims but also to those of the post-Bourbon political authorities in
‘patriot’ Spain. They rested their position on a contractual theory of the
relationship between the American ‘kingdoms’ and the Crown of Castile.
American notables, their power concentrated in the cabildos, attempted to
legitimise juntas of resistance which they sought to establish. Their revival
of the doctrine of ‘kingdoms in their own right’ precluded recognition of
any one peninsular junta. In opposition to Spanish perspectives, they did
not regard the American kingdoms as either colonies or dependencies of
the Kingdom of Castile. In this respect in the Americas it appeared as
though the moment of the notables had finally arrived, the opportunity,
that is, to reverse in constitutional terms the policies of the Bourbon era.
The ultimate objective was the formation of representative institutions
which would reflect the interests of the ‘constituted bodies of the realm’.

The first response from ‘patriot Spain’ was accommodating. The Supreme
Central Junta’s decree of 22 January 1809 from Aranjuez proclaimed the
Indies to be an ‘integral part of the monarchy’ and of equal constitutional
status to Spain. This decree invited the American Viceroyalties and
Captaincies General to send two representatives each to sit on the Junta.
A further decree on 22 May 1809 authorised Americans to elect deputies,
selected by the cabildos, to the forthcoming Cortes or imperial parliament
which would open in the patriot-controlled zone.38

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37 For the political collapse of Spain, see Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution
in Spain (Princeton, 1958), pp. 239–397; Brian R. Hamnett, La política española en una
epoca revolucionaria, 1790–1820 (Mexico City, 1985), pp. 30–62; Jacques Barbier,
‘Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade: the Dilemma of Charles IV’s Spain’, Journal

38 Still useful is Manuel Giménez Fernández, Las doctrinas populistas en la independencia de
Hispano-América (Seville, 1947). See also: A. F. Zimmerman, ‘Spain and its Revolted
The American separate-kingsdoms thesis reached its sharpest point in the ideas of the Peruvian Fray Melchor de Talamantes (resident in Mexico City), who became the ideologist of the Juntas convened by Viceroy José de Iturrigaray (1803–8) in Mexico City between July and September 1808. Talamantes argued that, as a consequence of the collapse of the Bourbon monarchy, the Kingdom of New Spain had the right to convene a ‘national congress’ (representing the entire Hispanic monarchy) with full sovereign powers. In practice, the viceroy would summon this congress, the strict function of which would be to conserve the ‘fundamental laws of the kingdom’. Talamantes regarded the American territories as an ‘important part of the nation’; again, he meant the Hispanic nation in both hemispheres. The membership of the congress would be corporative, including representatives from the armed forces, episcopate, audiencias, cabildos, nobility, and university. Talamantes clearly envisaged the primacy of Mexico City in these constitutional proceedings, and emphasised the leadership role of New Spain as Spain’s oldest and most important dominion in the Americas. This scheme, however, never came to fruition. A struggle for supremacy broke out between the Audiencia of Mexico and the City Council, in which the Consulado and the ecclesiastical hierarchy took the side of the former. This division provided the political opening for the swift peninsular coup d’état of 15–16 September 1808, which removed Iturrigaray from office and imprisoned the intellectual leadership. The peninsular coup prevented a peaceful, constitutional move towards autonomy based in the capital city. The pro-insurgent, Fray Servando Teresa de Mier, writing with hindsight, regarded the 1808 coup as the reason for the insurrection of 1810. The peninsular coup deprived Mexico City of the leadership of the process of revindication in New Spain, and, furthermore, denied New Spain the initiative in the subsequent process of Independence.

Venezuela, according to Michael McKinley, had absorbed the wartime depression after 1796 but not the political shocks of 1808. Forty signatories from among the notables requested the Captain General on 24 November 1808 to convene a junta in Caracas which would claim autonomy and equal status with Spain, but the response was a wave of

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arrests. The official action dealt a blow to the idea of autonomy within the empire and shattered the political consensus within the elites. In Chuquisaca, seat of the Audiencia of Charcas, and La Paz, a city and region of continual unrest since the rebellion of Tupac Katari, opposition movements of differing types provoked armed intervention from the viceregal authorities in Lima and Buenos Aires. Since 1807 political division within the governing organs of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate opened the way for outright defiance of Buenos Aires by the Audiencia of Chuquisaca on 25–26 May 1809 over the question of which authority to recognise in ‘patriot’ Spain. In La Paz, located strategically between Lima and Buenos Aires, a mestizo-led insurrection took control from 16 July until 25 October 1809. Thereafter, Royalist repression continued throughout the following year. To the north of the Viceroyalty of Peru, Quito notables, led by the Marqués de Selva Alegre, deposed the President of the Audiencia on 9 August 1809 without reference to the Viceroy of New Granada, and established a senate as the new centre of government. However, the opposition of the regional cities, Popayán (where 38% of New Granada’s slaves were concentrated) and Pasto (now situated in southern Colombia), Guayaquil (Ecuador’s Pacific port under the jurisdiction of Lima from 1803), and Cuenca (now in southern Ecuador), enabled Royalist forces from New Granada and Peru to extinguish the first Quito revolution on 25 November 1809.40

The vague creole patriotism, which had not identified with any specific American territory, became transformed into a thesis of defence of the ‘kingdoms’ expressed in corporative form. The crisis of 1808–10 forced American notables to define their political entities and objectives. Even so, this ‘kingdoms’ thesis could not really be described as incipient nationalism. The ‘nation’ referred to at the time was the ‘Hispanic nation’, of which these ‘kingdoms’ formed an integral part. Since no nations in the contemporary usage of the term existed in Ibero-America before Independence, no national consciousness could have been struggling to emancipate itself from colonial tutelage in 1808–10. In many respects the new self-definition as nation emerged during the wars: it was a product of the altered circumstances and political intensity of the armed struggle, which covered the period from 1809 to 1826. Since the outcome of war was to be the formation of a series of independent sovereign states, patria and reino had to be redefined accordingly. For the legitimate

40 McKinley, Pre-revolutionary Caracas, pp. 98, 146, 171. For Quito, see Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), Consejos 21,365: Quito (1819), Consejo de Indias (segunda sala), Madrid 7 June 1816 and 15 Oct. 1818; and Archivo General de Indias (Seville), Lima 799, President and Audiencia of Quito to Regency Council, Quito 21 July 1813.
constitution of a nation-state, revolutionary doctrines of sovereignty had to be employed. These went far beyond the Hispanic traditionalism of 1808.41

The events in Chuquisaca and Quito, like those in Mexico City and Caracas, were precipitated from within the elites themselves, which had divided over political and constitutional issues. These divisions, however, weakened elite predominance and exposed the territories involved to political radicalisation and an escalation of conflict. The implications of seizures of power by groups of notables in Spanish American cities passed well beyond the initial traditionalist predilection. In accordance with the contractual theory, the American ‘kingdoms’ possessed the right to resume their sovereignty, which had hitherto been vested in the Crown of Castile. The idea remained alive and re-emerged during the Spanish American crisis of 1808–10. Camilo Torres’s Memoria de Agravios of November 1809 argued from the basis of the equal kingdoms thesis, that with only nine representatives from America in contrast to the 36 from the Spanish provinces, the Supreme Central Junta would be in an unjust disequilibrium. Torres warned of the Quito example of secession. As legal assessor of the Bogotá city council, Torres proclaimed his desire to uphold the unity of Spain and America, as two equal parts of one monarchy, but without just representation there could be no legal bond. In Mier’s Historia de la Revolución de Nueva España antiguamente Anáhuac (London, 1813), the first work to be written on the origin and early progress of the American rebellions, a supposed ‘social compact’ between king and colonists was expressed in the Laws of the Indies. The corporative element in this thesis (which appealed so strongly to the American notables especially in the older viceroyalties) provided their guarantee of political continuity and their safeguard against popular mobilisation. They hoped to maintain stability through a process of political transformation at the highest levels of society. The appeal to the Hispanic tradition — not a rejection of Spain but the adoption of an alternative Spanish tradition — represented their defence against the creeping influence of revolutionary doctrines of sovereignty of the ‘people’ or ‘nation’.42


42 Torres’s statement of grievances was sent from the city council of Santa Fe de Bogotá to the Regency Council. Manuel José Forero, Camilo Torres, pp. 109–24. R. Gómez Hoyos, La revolución granadina de 1810: Ideario de una generación y de una época (1781–1821),
Peninsular resistance to attempts by the American notables to rearrange the distribution of power within the American territories provoked a bitter struggle which often resulted in protracted civil war. This conflict undermined the original corporativist project. Hispanic traditionalism and the neo-Scholasticism which frequently accompanied it proved inadequate to sustain this type of struggle.

*Autonomy, unitarism, separatism*

‘Patriot’ Spain abandoned absolutism for the first liberal constitutional experiment of 1810–14. The repercussions throughout the Indies of this transformation in the peninsula were profound. The Spanish Cortes of 1810–13 placed sovereignty in the ‘nation’, but defined that entity in the Constitution of 1812 as ‘the union of all Spaniards of both hemispheres’. Accordingly, no room existed for American autonomy, and since all representation was to be concentrated in the peninsula, no cortes could be formed within each of the principal American territories. The challenge of constitutional Spain and the necessities of war thrust upon American separatists the need to adopt the doctrine of sovereignty of the people (or nation) to their own circumstances. This doctrine had obvious French Revolutionary associations. Furthermore, it was also part of the Thirteen Colonies’ legitimisation of armed rebellion against the British Crown, and the subsequent establishment of a working republican state in North America. For these reasons the symbolism and ideology of resistance in Spanish America radicalised decisively after 1810. An essential characteristic was the development of an anti-colonial rhetoric, which strove to undermine the legitimacy of Spanish power in America.

Autonomists sought to loosen peninsular control by allowing for home rule within the empire in a monarchist system. They wanted to remove control of political life by the peninsular-dominated *consulados* and *audiencias*, and to broaden its base by including other corporate groups—landowners, nobles, lawyers, the universities, sections of the clergy—in decision-making. The aim was to move the focus on to the ‘resident elite’

and away from purely peninsular interests. They sought to institutionalise this shift through corporately organised 'juntas' consisting of representatives of the 'constituted bodies of the realm', by which they meant the above groups. They regarded this as constitutionally legitimate in view of the traditional nature of the distribution and exercise of power in the Hispanic world before c. 1750. This would amount to a peaceful transfer of power from Madrid-oriented interests to resident American notables (of whatever original provenance) and the establishment of a corporate structure of representation. Accordingly, the economic advances of the previous fifty years might be consolidated and social disruption avoided.43

Separatists, on the other hand, confronted the power of the consulado and audiencia, and sought to dismantle these institutions of the colonial state. They wanted a break with the metropolis and monarchy; they claimed the right to exercise full sovereignty within the separated entities. When they failed to dislodge the colonial regime by force, as in the case of Mexico in 1810–11, protracted warfare resulted, as the Mexico City Royalist regime, recovering control of the main cities of the central and northern plateau, fought back with an effective military arm, supported by most of the realigned elite and making use of the spiritual weapons at the disposal of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Where they initially succeeded, as in most of Spanish South America, conflict ensued between separatist capital-city elites and their regional rivals in the provincial capitals. The desire of separatists to control the organs of state power did not automatically transform them into nationalists. The breakdown of the Spanish American imperial system opened the way for separatist seizures of power or attempted revolutions during the 1810s. In most, if not all, cases the newly established sovereign states would subsequently engage in the task of formulating political society in national terms. In consequence, national identity and national sentiment would largely become state-induced phenomena during the century (or more) following Independence from the Iberian metropoles.44

Spanish unitarists argued that the Spanish American insurrections formed part of a common Hispanic movement against absolutism shared


by peninsular Spaniards and Americans alike. Peninsular Liberals, with Agustín Argüelles in the forefront, adopted this view in the Cortes of 1810–13. In their judgement, Spain and America required the same solutions, that is, the constitutionalisation of the whole monarchy and the implementation of a series of liberal reforms. American representation in the imperial Cortes would be, then, the panacea for the resolution of tension. If we accept these arguments, we lose any sense of the American movements as directed against all types of European colonial regime, whether absolutist or constitutionalist. The experience of Spanish America in 1810–14 and 1820–3 and then Brazil in 1821–3 should be enough to convince us otherwise.

The Spanish Cortes opened on the Isla de León near Cádiz in September 1810, six months after the Caracas revolution in April initiated the cycle of American separatist movements. The Cádiz Constitution of March 1812, which applied to the entire monarchy, was promulgated when these insurrections had persisted for nearly two years. The Cádiz government, accordingly, could not take the initiative, since events had already outpaced it. Furthermore, Cádiz merchants, interested primarily in the restoration of the colonial trade monopoly, opposed concessions to Americans. The Constitution’s unitary and centralist features, concentrating political power and representation in the imperial capital, were not only incompatible with American separatist objectives but were also difficult to reconcile with American autonomist sentiment. In consequence, little lasting possibility existed for an alliance between peninsular Liberals and American autonomists. The Cádiz Liberals’ attempt to provide the entire monarchy with a uniformity of laws and institutions conflicted with developments within the Americas since 1808. From the Spanish American perspective, the Constitution seemed to reverse rather than recognise these developments. Although the Constitution provided for American representation in the Cortes, on the new provincial deputations, and the constitutional city-councils, it could not resolve outstanding American problems because it did not address them. American elites benefited from the exclusion of peninsular Spaniards from election as American representatives in the Cortes, welcomed the reduction in the powers of viceroys and captains-general and the confinement of the audiencias to a judicial function, but essentially the relationship between the American territories and the metropolis remained dependent. In Spanish America, however, enactment of the provisions of the Constitution depended largely on the discretion of absolutist viceroys.

such as Abascal in Lima and Royalist military commanders, such as those in New Spain, engaged in a counter-insurgency struggle against separatist rebels.46

The Portuguese dominions passed through no parallel constitutional process until the early 1820s. The Braganza monarchy in Brazil governed according to traditional absolutist practices. Its vision remained imperial, despite the absence from Portugal. This unitarist spirit motivated the elevation of Brazil to the status of kingdom in 1815. As Oliveira Lima argued in 1908, this was done for imperial reasons not to promote Brazilian separatism. The Conde de Palmella, chief promoter of the scheme, acted with the intention of enhancing the international position of the Portuguese monarchy at a time of general European Counter-Revolution, when the political centre of the Portuguese Empire continued to be located in Rio de Janeiro. The internal political objective of assuaging Brazilian discontent was also taken on board. The Portuguese Cortes opened on 26 January 1821. Peninsular deputies set about dismantling the political unity of Brazil by subordinating individual provinces directly to the authority of Lisbon. The new Lisbon regime obliged John VI to return to Portugal in April. By such policies, the Portuguese Liberals precipitated the traditionalist Brazilian elites into a separatist stance, which the latter had so far managed to avoid. The availability of Dom Pedro, eldest son of John VI, in Rio would provide a monarchist channel and avoid the crisis of legitimacy concurrently experienced throughout most of Spanish America. The Portuguese constitutional system operated along similar principles to that of Cádiz by concentrating all representation in the peninsula. Furthermore, Article 20 of the Portuguese Constitution of 1 October 1821 defined the ‘Portuguese nation’ in both hemispheres in the same unitarist terms. José Honório Rodrigues, who described the Portuguese Revolution of 1820 as ‘anti-Brazilian’, argued that peninsular Liberals intended to reincorporate Brazil into a colonial commercial system with its focus in Lisbon. Accordingly, a rival Brazilian Constituent Assembly assembled in Rio during June 1822, with the aim of preserving the Brazilian political unity perceived as having been created in 1815. There was, however, no

guarantee that Portuguese America would inevitably become independent as one coherent entity.\(^{47}\)

The constitutional *via media* of representation within a unitary monarchy broke down precisely on this issue of continued metropolitan supremacy. At no point did either the Spanish Cortes of 1810–14 and 1820–3 or the Portuguese Cortes of 1821–3 propose to make concessions to American autonomist sentiment. The Iberian Cortes conceived of the empires as subordinate to the European metropolis in governmental, institutional, economic and representational terms. From American viewpoints, such a stance continued the imperial policies of the Habsburg, Bourbon and Braganza monarchies of the old regime. In many respects, separatism resulted less from a widespread commitment than from the slow erosion of any middle possibility. The gravity of this situation had already become apparent within the Spanish world well before Ferdinand VII dissolved the Cortes of Madrid in May 1814 and nullified the constitutional system. It recurred as a prevailing issue of contention between European and American deputies during the second Spanish constitutional period (1820–3). Ultimately, the collapse of a *via media* led to a reluctant separatism in the two old Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru after 1821.

In Portuguese America, by contrast, this kind of tension between elected representatives of European and American territories within the monarchy was delayed until the convocation of the Lisbon Cortes in 1821, as a result of the Oporto insurrection of Liberal officers earlier in that year. Furthermore, the presence of the court in Rio de Janeiro from 1808 until 1821 put aside the older issue of the political status of Brazil and its constitutional relationship to metropolitan Portugal.\(^{48}\)

**Popular participation**

Division within the elites, especially polarities between region and centre, opened the way for popular action, as was the case in New Spain, Venezuela and New Granada during the early 1810s, and in southern Peru in 1814–15. At the same time, the decision to opt for separatism led to armed conflict with the representatives and supporters of colonial

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\(^{48}\) Hamnett, *Política española*, pp. 120–39.
authority. New Spain provided the most striking instance of popular appeal by insurrectionary leaders. The Mexico City coup of September 1808 by the Spanish party prevented any move towards autonomy or, subsequently, independence based on the capital city municipality. The contrast with the principal South American cities was striking. In Caracas, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe de Bogotá, and Santiago de Chile between April and September 1810, American separatists swiftly displaced the peninsular authorities. They were able to do so through effective subversion of the colonial militias. These bodies then formed the nucleus of patriot armies for the defence of the newly formed states.49 This option was not available in New Spain. Instead, the discovery of the Querétaro conspiracy by the royal authorities obliged the dissident priest, Father Miguel Hidalgo, one of the leaders, to appeal to the popular classes from his parish in Dolores (Guanajuato) on 16 September 1810. This direct appeal reflected the failure in Mexico of the South American model.50

The conjunction of separatism and popular participation introduced an entirely different perspective. This further presaged departure from the creole patriotism which had developed since the mid-seventeenth century. Similarly, it meant a decisive move away from the limited creole vision, whether of autonomy within the Empire or of separatism led by the American elites. The logical political consequences of popular recruitment into separatist movements would be, first, removal of the colonial juridical structure founded upon caste and corporation, and second, inclusion of non-elite socio-ethnic groups into the representative processes. The movement originally led by Hidalgo developed in this way during the period of Father José María Morelos’s supremacy from 1811 until 1815. This did not, however, constitute a social revolution in the contemporary sense of a systematic transfer of property and wealth to a non-possessing group.51

Mexican revolutionary leaders both envisaged the creation of a separate sovereign state and sought to dismantle the internal colonial juridical


50 Brading, Church and State, pp. 239–40, comments: ‘That Miguel Hidalgo should have headed the Mexican Insurgency was a measure of the crisis in authority and belief that characterised this period. For he numbered among the most learned priests in his diocese...’

structure. Morelos’s *Sentimientos a la Nación*, addressed to the rebel Congress of Chilpancingo on 14 September 1813, and the Constitution of Apatzingán (22 October 1814) expressed those principles. The Mexican insurgency broadened the social base of the earlier creole patriotism. The leadership, nevertheless, maintained active, though clandestine, connections with members of the pre-revolutionary opposition, with Mexico City intellectuals, still mostly operating within the mental world of creole patriotism, and with Americans hoping to advance their cause through the Cádiz constitutional system. Mexican insurgents sought a name for their prospectively independent territory from pre-Columbian sources. Under the influence of Carlos María de Bustamante, they adopted in 1813–14 the name, ‘Republic of Anáhuac’, to supersede ‘New Spain’. In Bustamante’s view, the struggle for Independence represented a revindication of the Nahua peoples crushed by the Spanish conquerors in 1521 when the Aztec Empire had been overthrown.\(^{52}\) Creole patriotism in those parts of America which had not been centres of pre-Columbian civilisations tended to veer towards influences derived from the European Enlightenment. In the Venezuelan case, these ideas became radicalised during the early 1810s into a republicanism derived from the models of the United States and the French Revolution. Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), at that time in the political vanguard in Venezuela, took many of his political ideas from the classical republicanism adopted in France in the early 1790s. This republicanism, however, was socially exclusive.

The Independence movements were not by origin popular movements, but they came to involve a broad range of participation. This was neither systematic nor consistent: sometimes popular mobilisation benefited the ‘patriot’ or insurgent cause, at times the Royalist. Mobilisation, furthermore, could come from above or below. Popular participation could be spontaneous or induced, stimulated by leaders within peasant communities and local chieftains able to activate their cliental linkages or by the arrival in the neighbourhood of well-known popular figures, such as ‘El Amo Torres’ in the vicinity of Guadalajara in October 1810, intent upon recruitment into insurgent bands.\(^{53}\) On the other hand, military recruitment by the official leaders of ‘patriot’ armies or by Royalist commanders could bring lower socio-ethnic groups into direct participation. Brigadier José Manuel de Goyeneche (1776–1846) formed the Royalist Army of Upper Peru largely through conscription imposed on


the local population of the Cuzco and Lake Titicaca zones after 1809. This powerful force held off the patriot armies until the final defeat at Ayacucho in December 1824.54

Both insurgent and Royalist leaderships sought to retain control over popular groups, mobilised or spontaneously participating. This proved to be their most intractable task. In many instances, the prevailing fear running throughout the period of the Independence movements was elite loss of control. This loss would have two distinct aspects: first, loss of control over the central political processes, whether by colonial authorities in the months immediately preceding the outbreak of rebellion, or by the newly installed authorities thereafter; and second, loss of control by both Royalist and insurgent leadership cadres over popular groups adhering to either side in the armed struggles that ensued. Loss of control threatened to alter the entire nature and course of the political transformation envisaged by patriot or insurgent leaderships. Their dilemma should be seen in the context of the constitutional predilections of the earlier generation of colonial elites in the period from 1770 to 1810. Even in Peru, where Abascal retained tight control at the centre, this problem arose at the provincial level, as the impact and extent of the Cuzco Rebellion of 1814–15 testified.55

The term ‘popular’ participation is used here to signify the activities of a range of non-elite socio-ethnic groups ranging from local proprietors, ranchers and peasant farmers, muleteers, hacendado-overseers, artisans, Indian caciques and community peasants, blacks (free or enslaved), mulattoes or ‘pardos’, to various professional categories (lay, clerical, or military) at the local level. Such groups frequently had mutual intercourse and should not be regarded as isolated categories. In any case, there were many over-lapping functions. They represented a variegated stratification – cross-sections of local society – that departs from a rigid dualism of juxtaposed ‘elites’ and ‘masses’. Since social class based on economic position did not exclusively form the basis of stratification in early nineteenth-century Ibero-America, a simple classist definition is also

54 Examples may be found throughout Ella Dunbar Temple, *La acción patriótica en la emancipación: Guerrillas y Montoneras: Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú*, 6 vols. (Lima, 1971); e.g. vol. 1, pp. xxix–xxx, ‘Indians from a large number of the villages of the Peruvian countryside played a significant part in the war of guerrilla bands and as recruits into the army’. Many ecclesiastics, including religious, took part in these guerrilla actions.

inappropriate. The concept of ‘people’ employed here, while not ignoring lower social groups in capital cities, has a strongly local and provincial flavour. During the Independence period much ‘popular’ action came precisely from provincial elements resentful of colonial bureaucracies (lay or ecclesiastical) and merchant-financiers, whose political and economic base lay in capital cities.

In both the Mexican centre–north and the Peruvian south, lower social groups were frequently brought into participation through the intervention of local proprietors or professional men. The Hidalgo rebellion of September 1810, essentially provincial, dispensed with the South American model of capital city-revolution based on the municipal councils. Hidalgo, Allende, Abasolo, Aldama, López Rayón, Morelos, Cos and Matamoros all fell into those categories. They provided the official political and military leadership of the insurrection during the years from 1810 to 1815. At the same time a large number of virtually autonomous bands under their own recognised leaders operated in specific places and times throughout the 1810s. Torres, Villagrán, Juan Francisco Osorno, Albino García, Rafael Iriarte, Pedro Moreno, Gordiano Guzmán, and many other chieftains, whose social origins tended to be lower than those of the official leadership, led such bands. Their targets were usually locally based Spanish merchants and shop-keepers, Spanish merchants caught in provincial capitals which had fallen under rebel control, or landed proprietors (American or Spanish) identified with the Royal cause or perpetrators of some locally perceived abuse. With varying degrees of success, Vicente Guerrero attempted through the years 1815–21 to bind rebel chieftains together in a common movement recognising specific political aims and with a recognised ideological position.56

In many respects, the social origins of the leadership of the Cuzco Rebellion resembled that of the central–northern Mexico insurrection. The leaders, the three Angulo brothers and José Gabriel Béjar, were mestizos and creoles. They could count on the support of a considerable number of members of the lower secular and regular clergy, as well as the support of the Bishop of Cuzco, José Pérez Armendáriz (b. Paucartambo 1748). This leadership group extended an initially urban movement into the countryside by inviting the cacique of Chincheros, Mateo García Pumacahua, to join the rebellion. A long-standing Royalist, who had

actively opposed Tupac Amaru in 1781, Pumacahua held senior military rank and had been an interim President of the Audiencia of Cuzco. The Angulos were local hacienda-owners also involved in mining-operations and commerce. Natives of Cuzco, they had been educated in local colleges and at the University of San Antonio Abad, a hot-bed of dissident ideas. Juan Angulo was parish priest of Lares (Calca) and Mariano, who had embarked on a military career, had been Subdelegate of Abancay. José Angulo, who provided the main contacts with the rebels of Buenos Aires, had many meetings with the Loaysa family, one of whose members, María Ignacia, was the wife of Pumacahua. Dr Felipe Loaysa, Rector of the College of San Francisco Borja, was a dissident cleric. He and his two brothers, both parish priests, had been pupils of Armendariz.57

The Cuzco Rebellion extended rapidly to Huancavelica, Huamanga, Puno, Arequipa, and La Paz on 24 September 1814. La Paz fell after the ‘plebe’ had rampaged through the city streets, as in 1782. Such rebel successes threatened to cut communications between the Lima government and the Royalist army of Upper Peru operating against the Buenos Aires army. The Lima elite, which remained tactically allied with Abascal, totally opposed the rebellion, as they had done that of Tupac Amaru. They feared a simultaneous uprising of coastal hacienda slaves in Ica, Cañete, and Pisco. The prompt action of the Royalist General Juan Ramírez, who recovered Arequipa on 9 December 1814 and routed Pumacahua’s forces at Humachiri on 11 March 1815, salvaged the viceregal government’s position in the south. Basadre put forward the interesting argument that ‘if the rebellion had attained its full objectives..., a Peruvian nation would have emerged, free from outside intervention, with a mestizo, Indian, creole, and provincial base’, totally distinct from the Peruvian Republic which was created in Lima after 1821 by the propertied and intellectual elites. The scale of forces mobilised by the Cuzco Rebellion far exceeded the numbers fighting in the formal battles at the end of the Peruvian struggle in 1823–5.58

57 The Audiencia of Cuzco, reconstituted after the collapse of the rebellion, disparaged the social provenance of the leadership: Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia de Lima, legajo 796, Audiencia of Cuzco to Viceroy Abascal, Cuzco 5 May 1815 – ‘a handful of men of the lowest extraction’. See also: Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Pumacahua. La Revolución del Cuzco de 1814. Estudio documentado (Cuzco, 1956), pp. 181–3, 222–45. Manuel Jesús Aparicio Vega, El clero patriota en la revolución de 1814 (Cuzco, 1974), pp. 34–9, 169, 172–3, 269, 284–7. Ubalde, executed on 5 December 1805, had also been a pupil at San Antonio Abad. Similarly, Pedro Domingo Murillo, mestizo leader of the La Paz uprising of 16 July 1809, had been a pupil at the same institution.

According to the Royalist General José Canterac, three-quarters of the population of the entire area from the Desaguadero River to Jujuy—Indians, ‘cholos’ (mestizos), mulattoes, blacks—were all enemies of whites in general. The latter were concentrated in capital cities and chiefly occupied in commerce. Canterac pointed to the sporadic history of insurgent activity by this majority, which he attributed to persuasion by some local chief of note. Most Royalist troops, moreover, had been recruited among this majority, particularly the ‘cholos’ (‘small, robust, taciturn, valiant, silent, humble’), though especially in the province of Cochabamba they resented service beyond their home area. Desertions were frequent. Upper Peru, situated between the two poles of Lima and Buenos Aires, was exceptionally difficult to govern effectively. The social and economic changes in the central agricultural and textile-producing zones, chiefly in the Intendancy of Cochabamba, escalated tensions in the last decades of the colonial period. The direct connection between subsistence crisis, tension between hacienda and peasant producer, recession in the textile sector, pressure of civil taxation before 1810, and insurgent action during the subsequent fifteen years is as difficult to ascertain there as in the case of New Spain’s centre-northern zones.59

Cochabamba became the scene of intense conflict during the Wars of Independence. A rebel force estimated at up to 60,000 threatened Oruro in 1811. Indians from Chayanta and Sicasica supplied Manuel Belgrano’s Platine army until its two defeats at Vilcapujio (1 October 1813) and Ayohuma (14 November 1813). Sicasica had been the core region of the Tupac Katari rebellion three decades earlier. Other rebel bands operated in the province of La Paz, also led by local village chiefstains or natives of La Paz, and many had been sergeants, corporals or soldiers in the Royal army. Side-changing was a frequent occurrence. The popular insurgency was met by brutal repression: the Royalist army burnt villages up to La Paz’s city limits. Ramírez’s action prevented the Cuzco Rebellion from escalating through Upper Peru. Rebel bands there did not regroup effectively until April 1816, under the leadership of Eusebio Lira. They continued to harass Royalist forces, though with less intensity than in the period before 1815.60

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59 José Canterac, Cuartel General en Tupisa (Upper Peru) 30 June 1818: Resumen histórico del mes de junio de 1818, in Dunbar Temple, La acción patriótica, I, doc. 9, pp. 17–25.


Neither General José de San Martín (1778–1850) nor Bolívar appealed directly for a mass uprising in the Perus. Nevertheless, the needs of warfare led to the incorporation of popular elements and to the specific organisation of local guerrilla bands, especially in the central Andean zone from late 1820. When San Martín entered Lima on 12 July 1821 his force of 4,500 men consisted no longer of the troops raised in the River Plate and Chile, who had been killed or deserted, but of blacks from the Peruvian coastal haciendas whose hatred for their masters the patriots were able to exploit.

In central Peru San Martín authorised the formation of guerrilla bands (montoneros) from local villages from late 1820 onwards, in order to cut Royalist lines of communication and supplement the official forces’ actions. Again, the leadership of the bands of some 40–150 men came from a cross-section of local society, from provincial notables (caciques or gamonales) to rural bandits. San Martín, however, attached little importance to the montoneros of the central sierra, and regarded them more as a diversion than as a serious threat to Royalist forces. These socially conservative attitudes may well have contributed to the deterioration of his position in the interior. Royalist forces in Peru in the period 1821–4 also made use of popular groups to contain patriot activities. Whether the bands were republican or royalist, peasants formed their membership. Where not forcibly recruited, their participation probably corresponded more to their own interests than to those envisaged by the official leadership in the wider struggle.

The issue of popular participation during the Independence struggles is linked to the question of what ‘the people’ were doing before the events of the 1810s and early 1820s. The scale of participation by lower socio-

61 AGI Lima 800, Teniente de Fragata Pedro de Tavira to Secretario de Gobernanza de Ultramar, Madrid 12 Apr. 1822.

ethnic groups in the movements of protest and rebellion from 1765 to 1783 was impressive. However, the four most outstanding instances of popular participation during the 1810s and early 1820s – Mexico, Venezuela, Lower Peru, Upper Peru – did not always correspond to the areas involved earlier. Not even the Tupac Amaru rebellion of the early 1780s had a direct continuity with the Cuzco Rebellion of 1814–15. Pumacahua, for instance, never claimed Inca descent; the creole–mestizo leadership, ideologically closer to Chuquisaca and Buenos Aires than to Juan Santos Atahualpa and Tupac Amaru, sought to construct a national Peruvian state above socio-ethnic divisions.

In Venezuela the expansion of coastal business interests into the interior stimulated opposition from plains society. Accordingly, the creole planters’ oligarchy which constituted the First Venezuelan Republic of 1811–12 rapidly faced the full onslaught of provincial and popular opposition. The cacao-producing hacienda-owners (mantuanos), who took power in Caracas in April 1810, had intended to establish a narrowly based regime of exporters and slave-holders. Provincial uprisings from Coro and Maracaibo combined with slave rebellion to destroy the Republic. Bolívar’s Cartagena Manifesto of 15 December 1812 attributed revolutionary collapse to incompetence, factionalism and the unsuitability of the 1811 federal Constitution. The rebellion of the pardo llaneros of the Orinoco Basin under the Asturian, José Tomás Boves (1782–1814), caudillo of the plainsmen, destroyed the Second Venezuelan Republic of 1813–14. Bolívar’s Jamaica Letter of 6 September 1813 called for a strong central authority within the revolutionary system and reassured planters that Independence would not threaten their social position.63

The destruction of the Second Republic forced Bolívar to take refuge first in the neighbouring territory of New Granada, then largely under patriot control. After an exile (including a period in Haiti in 1815–16) passed in rethinking the reasons for the disasters he had experienced, Bolívar broadened the socio-ethnic base of the movement. From 1816 to 1817 the remains of the separatist movement began to construct a multi-ethnic coalition, rejected by the slave-owner revolutionaries of 1810, directed towards the achievement of Independence for the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. Bolívar, however, confined emancipation to slaves enlisting immediately in revolutionary forces. The new territorial base of the insurrection would be deep in the interior, the plains (llanos) of the

Orinoco. Bolívar's great achievement lay in attracting the *llaneros* away from Royalism and attaching them to the revolutionary cause. Royalist resistance and patriot division delayed the goal of Independence until 1821. Popular opposition to a Caracas-based oligarchy in 1810 had ultimately delayed the achievement of Independence for eleven years. When it was brought about, the end result corresponded very little to the original perception of the coastal slavocracy. In the first place, Bolívar, who had no political base within Venezuela, envisaged a vast territorial unit including Venezuela, New Granada and Quito under one government in Santa Fe de Bogotá. The Congress of Angostura, which opened in the Orinoco heartland on 19 February 1819, established the 'Republic of Colombia' on 17 December. Bolívar’s frequent absence from Venezuela left effective power with the *llanero* chieftain, José Antonio Páez, an illiterate herdsman from Barinas Province. Páez, in tactical alliance with rival families within the oligarchy, dominated the country until the end of the 1840s.64

*People* and *Nation*

The Venezuelan experience formed a bitter comment on the national project idea. The planters had envisaged a 'nation' which excluded the vast majority of the population. The contrast with the Morelos project in Mexico could not have been greater. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1811 had taken a different course. High property qualifications made political participation racially and socially exclusive. Morelos’s perception of a dual revolution was not shared by the Caracas oligarchy, any more than by the Mexican elite. Regardless of the existing social and ethnic tensions within the Captaincy-General, they intended to use removal of peninsular rule as the prelude to the establishment of a constitutional oligarchy. The National Congress’s proclamation of sovereignty of the people on 1 July 1811 had an entirely different sense from the Mexican Constitution of Apatzingán. It limited the political nation to the great landed proprietors, in a society in which the majority were non-white. During the Morelos leadership the insurgency movement intended to use separation from Spain as the prelude to the political and juridical reconstitution of New Spain — not through property redistribution, but by the removal of caste distinctions. The constitutional system envisaged in 1813–14 provided for the political incorporation of the adult male population into the representative processes. In that respect, this

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constitutional project was also a national project, in that it sought to include rather than exclude the majority of the population (again, regardless of colonial caste). The Morelos leadership group understood that no attempt to create a national identity could have lasting validity without the corresponding institutions. The republican system envisaged in 1813–14 was designed to give concrete expression to this aim. Yet the Venezuelan oligarchs shared one common objective with the Mexican insurgents. They, too, rejected both Bourbon absolutism and the unitary constitutionalism elaborated in the Spanish Cortes in 1810–14. In their adoption of the doctrine of sovereignty of the people, both revolutions expressed rejection of the Cádiz Cortes’ attribution of the sole exercise of sovereignty to itself. Both rejected the Cortes’ definition of the ‘nation’ in the Constitution of 1812 as the totality of all ‘Spanish citizens’ in both hemispheres.65

No viable national project existed in Venezuela between 1810 and 1817. A comparison between Morelos’s Tecpan decree of 13 October 1811 and Bolivar’s Carúpano and Ocumare Proclamations of 2 June and 6 July 1816 reveals the length of time travelled by Bolívar to reach objectives corresponding to those of Mexico’s second insurgent caudillo. Morelos moved rapidly towards the adoption of the category ‘Americans’ (not yet ‘Mexicans’) for all inhabitants of New Spain not born in the peninsula. Bolivar took nearly five more years to declare that ‘from this time forth there shall be only one class of men in Venezuela: all shall be citizens’. Even so, the Colombian Constitution of Cúcuta of 30 August 1821 upheld a property-value qualification of at least $500 for electors in the tier system of representation.66

San Martín’s decree following the patriot occupation of Lima in July 1821 similarly established that: ‘in the future, the indigenous population shall not be called Indians or “natives”: they are sons and citizens of Peru, and they shall be known as Peruvians’. These decrees made new legal definitions and new political loyalties. Since ‘nation’ began to supersede ‘people’ as a concept in this process of state-foundation, the notion of territoriality would not be far behind.67 Mexican ‘Indians’ became

65 C. Parra-Pérez, Historia de la Primera República de Venezuela, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1959), II, pp. 15–23. A Revolutionary junta of 23 notables in Caracas conducted indirect elections from which a ‘national congress’ resulted on 2 Mar. 1811. Only those of the free population who owned property valued at 2,000 pesos or over (a high rate at the time) had the right to vote. 42 deputies represented seven provinces. Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional, pp. 92–9, 113, 117–20.

66 Torre Villar, Los creadores, pp. 573–9, 580–406. Izard, El miedo a la revolución, pp. 60–1, 143–57.

'citizens', equal according to the law to all other 'citizens' of the Republic constituted in 1824. Even so, few Mexican social commentators regarded lower ethnic groups as part of the 'nation'; at least until the Liberal Reform movement of mid-century, they saw the creation of the new Mexican nation through creole eyes.68

In Brazil, a violent conflict between the regions took place behind the façade of imperial continuity. The transfer of the capital from Salvador to Rio had already set this process in motion. As we shall see later, it did not play itself out until the 1850s. In the North-East, recession, inflation, tax pressures from the government in Rio, and the enduring presence of slavery greatly complicated the local elites' efforts to remove the predominance of Portuguese merchants in the period 1817–21. The rebellion in Pernambuco from March to May 1817 was essentially an elite-led movement in which no significant transformation of the social structure or the means of production was envisaged. The Recife Provisional Government reflected a cross-section of the upper classes and excluded popular representatives. José Honório Rodrigues has argued that the process of Independence in Brazil was not, as traditionally stated, a peaceful and amicable separation. On the contrary, it involved a far-reaching mobilisation of armed force on a scale comparable to Spanish America, though in the more concentrated period of eighteen months. The most serious conflicts took place in Bahia, Maranhão, and Pará, where the Portuguese position was strongest. The decisive steps towards Brazilian Independence were taken by the municipal council of Rio, with the support of the southern tier of provinces, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. By contrast, the north and north-east remained loyal to the Portuguese Cortes in 1821–2. Since the 'Portuguese party', which recognised the concentration of sovereignty in Lisbon, was in favour of the separation of these provinces, a real danger existed of the break-up of Brazil. Rio de Janeiro's victory imposed south-eastern hegemony on the northern and north-eastern provinces. Brazil became independent as an Empire without, as Mexico had, previously passing through a decade of social and political upheaval. The provincial

Ibero-American Independence Movements origins of the Pernambuco movements of 1817 and 1823 resembled those of the early stages of the Mexican insurrection of 1810 or the Cuzco Rebellion of 1814-15, though without the mobilisation of the vast ethno-social base. This came later, in the provincial and popular insurrections of the Regency period (1831-41).69

The immediate conjunction of 'people', 'nation' and 'state' was not the reality that emerged in Ibero-America during the course of the 1820s. The type of state established reflected the primacy of elite interests. Nevertheless, ideological and regional differences within these elites destabilised oligarchic rule and opened the way for non-elite entrants into the political processes. Furthermore, the legacy of the armed struggles of the previous ten or fifteen years remained all-pervading. The experience of lower-class mobilisation did not vanish once Independence had been attained. The Brazilian uprisings and the rebellions in Mexico during the same period testified to that. Considerable popular participation could also be seen in the Venezuelan rebellions of the 1840s, which recalled earlier actions in the 1810s. On the contrary, local issues still remained, and the broader question of the relationship of peasant communities or bonded labour to the new national states remained to be resolved. Local, community, or ethno-linguistic identities continued to challenge the realisation of a national project at many levels. Lower-class participation in insurgency movements or patriot campaigns had thrown up middle and lower-level leadership cadres. In some cases such individuals, with their own armed clienteles, continued to control large tracts of territory, whether nominally within the jurisdiction of the national government or beyond its control altogether.

Region and centre

Most Ibero-American territories experienced some element of tension, and many outright polarisation, between regions and the central power in the aftermath of the collapse of the colonial state. Provincial centrifugalism reached its most extreme instance within the territory of the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate, established only thirty-two years before the imperial breakdown of 1808. Bolivar failed to prevent the creation of a Bolivian state out of the former territory of Upper Peru, in 1826, independent of both Buenos Aires and Lima. Bolivar's Greater Colombian state, originally consisting of seven territories, disintegrated by 1830 into three separate sovereign entities. In New Granada proper, geographical obstacles combined with different political and economic interests to ensure that distinct regional polities would emerge after Independence,

69 Mota, Nordeste 1817, pp. 21, 51-2, 66. Reis, Rebelliao escrava, pp. 26-8, 30-5.
particularly during the era of Liberal and federal supremacy between 1849 and the 1870s. In the former Viceroyalty of New Spain, regional sentiment combined with the temporary political weakening of the centre core during the 1810s to enable the establishment of two federal experiments between 1824 and 1836 and between 1846 and 1853, each of them brought down by superior central and conservative forces, usually with the support of the regular army. In Central America, the collapse of the political unity of the colonial era expressed through the Kingdom of Guatemala led to the definitive establishment of separate, sovereign states after 1840, in opposition to the traditional primacy of Guatemala City. Within Spanish America only the territorially compact Chilean state, focused on Santiago, Valparaíso and Concepción, managed to avoid internal division or outright disintegration.\(^70\)

Separatism, then, threw open the whole issue of the redistribution of power within the former colonial territories and set provincial elites and their various allies in opposition to capital city or ‘national-level’ elites. To Guerra’s argument that the exercise of power in the colonial system had been vertical rather than horizontal should be added the point that it had not been voluntary either. The removal of monarchical central authority automatically dissolved the bonds between provinces within American territories. This type of inter-regional and region–centre tension did not derive uniquely from the conditions of armed conflict during the Wars of Independence. The roots lay in the colonial era, in changing economic patterns and political weight. For that reason, the constitutional forms contested after Independence were not doctrinal accretions, but represented attempts to reshape the new sovereign entities in a manner which best reflected regional perspectives. Discussion and

conflict arose from the rival claims made for centralism, federation, or confederation, or whether the regions were ‘departments’ (on the French Revolutionary model of 1791), ‘states’ (on the US model of 1787), or ‘provinces’.71

In the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata fragmentation delayed the formation of an Argentine national state until the 1860s. By mid-1815, for instance, José Artigas, caudillo of the eastern littoral, formed the ‘League of the Free Peoples of the Littoral’ out of the Banda Oriental, Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and Santa Fe. Factional conflict over the regional balance destroyed the cohesion of the Congress of Tucumán, which proclaimed the independence of the ‘United Provinces of the River Plate’ in 1816, and brought down all governments until 1829. By 1820–1, thirteen of these fourteen provinces had rejected the authority of the city of Buenos Aires and the centralist provisions of the Constitution of 1819, by behaving as virtually sovereign entities. In consequence, the prevailing issue became whether or not there was to be any authority at all above the level of the individual province. Several provincial constitutions, those of Santa Fe (1819), Corrientes (1824), San Juan (1825), and Santiago del Estero (1832) made no provision for any Platine state superior to the provinces. Other constitutions, such as those of Tucumán (1820), and Catamarca (1823), described their sovereignty and independence as subordinate to the resolutions of a ‘General Congress of the Nation’. The provincial constitutions of Córdoba (1821), Salta (1821), and Entre Ríos (1823), envisaged the presence of a superior state above the provinces, which were in confederation with it and with one another. When a Constituent Congress met in 1824–6, reflecting the perspectives of the city of Buenos Aires, the provinces roundly rejected its centralism.72

In many respects, post-Independence developments followed different patterns in Mexico and the River Plate zone. The Supreme Executive Power, which superseded the defunct First Mexican Empire in 1823, managed, with the aid of a section of the regular armed forces, to contain the radical federalist movements in Jalisco, Puebla, and Oaxaca, former colonial Intendancies, which claimed that sovereignty had devolved upon them rather than the National Congress sitting in Mexico City. Military

intervention in these ‘Free Sovereign States’ in 1823–4 curbed the centrifugal tendencies of the regional movements and established a compromise in the form of the Federal Constitution of 1824. Although the 18 Mexican states still retained important fiscal powers and the right to recruit militias to defend their ‘sovereignty’ the centre gained more than simply residual powers. Even so, the fiscal constraints on the central power frustrated the emergence of a viable national government during the First Federal Republic. The two Centralist Republics of 1836–46 and 1853–5 involved attempts both to crush the state militias and to impose national taxation on the ‘departments’, to which the former states were reduced.\(^{73}\) In the River Plate zone, the collapse of the colonial state in 1810 and its replacement by independent provinces exposed the weakness of capital city-dominance. The long supremacy of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1829–52) equally demonstrated the debility of the institutions put in place after the creation of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate in 1776. After 1819, no certainty existed at all that a Platine state would come into existence above the individual provinces. Centrifugalism reached a climax in the Pacto Federal of 1831. Even though the constitution of the province of Santa Fe (1841) implied that the province pertained to a confederation known as the ‘República Argentina’, and that of Córdoba (1849) described the province as linked to other provinces through the ‘confederation’ envisaged in the Pact of 1831, no institutional configuration resulted during the Rosas era.\(^{74}\)

The Emperor Pedro I (1822–31) was determined to prevent the establishment of a constitutional system in Brazil which would place power in the hands of congress. Accordingly, in October 1822 he dissolved the constituent assembly. This precipitate action threatened to compromise the tenuous unity of the Brazilian provinces and the political centre. The imperial-sponsored Constitution of 25 March 1824 failed to resolve the question of the distribution of power between Rio de Janeiro and the provinces by attempting to impose a form of centralism.\(^{75}\)

\(^{73}\) Timothy E. Anna, *The Mexican Empire of Iturbide* (Lincoln, Nebraska, and London, 1990), pp. 189–216, for the fall of the Empire. Timothy E. Anna, ‘The Iturbide Interregnum’, in Rodríguez (ed.), *The Independence of Mexico*, pp. 185–99, argues that ‘Iturbide’s elite followers could not have felt any sense of Mexican nationalism. The process of Iguala failed to produce nationalism, and in this it does not differ from the independence movements in Spanish America in general’ (p. 190).


opposition developed in the provinces during the course of 1824, especially the North-East, from which the 1817 movement had sprung. On 2 July, the president of the province of Pernambuco proclaimed the formation of the ‘Confederation of the Equator’, with its focus in Recife. This was joined by Ceará, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte. A military campaign finally broke up the Confederation by September. The cycle of Brazilian revolts during the 1830s and 1840s in opposition to Rio de Janeiro predominance revealed profound though diverse social and economic motivations. In the Cabanos revolt in southern Pernambuco in 1831, ‘communities of fugitive slaves and free Indians provided the backbone’. Bahia separated from Brazil during the Sabinada rising of 1837–8. In the Farrapos uprising of 1835–45, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina embarked upon a more durable separatist course that threatened union with Uruguay and the formation of a cattle-owners’ republic of the south. In the Brazilian far-north, rebels sacked the cotton and cattle-trading town of Caxias in July 1839 during the course of the Balaiaida rebellion of 1839–40 in Maranhão. Social and regional conflict continued in the uprisings in Minas Gerais and São Paulo in 1842 and in the Praiera rebellion in Recife in 1848. Military defeat of each of the provincial opposition movements maintained the precarious territorial integrity of the Brazilian Empire. The absence of any ‘national-level’ leadership of the popular revolts, and their consequent confinement to their heartlands, facilitated military repression. Ostensibly centralist, the Imperial state remained poor, due to the inadequacy of its fiscal base.  

Conclusions

The problems of transition from ancien régime structures and absolute monarchies to constitutional states was not unique to Ibero-America, but was shared throughout most of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, the post-colonial trauma of creating not

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only a viable state (and one which upheld the rule of law) but also a
national identity would be shared in Asia and Africa in the second half of
the twentieth century. The Ibero-American Independence movements
represented more than attempts to alter the balance of political forces
within ancien régime polities. They may have started out from that
direction, but they became entirely different phenomena. In view of the
political crisis within the Iberian world in 1808, a crisis which came in the
wake of the American and French Revolutions, neither Ibero-America nor
Iberia could escape from the ideological influences of the time. The
adoption of the doctrine of sovereignty of the people by Spanish
American revolutionary movements, necessary to legitimise rebellion
against a hitherto legal authority, remained an outstanding case in point.
This stood in marked contrast to ethno-social realities. Accordingly, the
movements of the 1810s and early 1820s were qualitatively different from
the earlier rebellions. This difference lay in the ideological, socio-
economic and international context.

Popular participation took official leaderships by surprise, even when
they themselves had initiated the process of mobilisation. The threat of
loss of control was recurrent. Popular participation during the Wars of
Independence helps to explain the political turbulence of the subsequent
half-century. It is not the sole explanation, since many other factors, not
least of which was the crisis of legitimacy in Spanish America, had a
decisive impact. The elites’ appropriation of nationalism – their attempts
to shape the post-colonial polities in their own image and exclude or
marginalise the majority – provided a further destabilising element. The
elites adopted the doctrine of sovereignty of the nation or people, in order
to legitimise the break with the metropolis. They adopted constitutio
nalism as a reaction to ministerial absolutism. Yet they had no
intention of creating either open political systems or functioning
democracies. There were no more blatant incongruities than in Peru,
where 90% of the Republic’s inhabitants were regarded as outside the
‘nation’, and in Brazil’s constitutional monarchy, where nearly half the
population in the 1820s were slaves.

Those who initiated the process of change in 1808 could not have
foretold its outcome in the 1820s. International conditions had radically
changed. The new Latin American ‘nations’ arose out of the conflicts of
this period and under the contradictory influences of the political ideas
and forces of the times. They had not existed before this period. Issues in
1808 and 1810 were not conceived in national terms. Independence did
not mean the emancipation of pre-existing nations from an alien imperial
culture. Substantially, no language, cultural, or religious barriers divided
the dominant national elites from those of the colonial era. Accordingly,
conditions which had prevailed in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires were totally different from those in the Habsburg, Russian, or Ottoman Empires at the time of the emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century. The 'nation-states' were elite-initiated devices designed to fill the void after the collapse of the colonial regime. Karen Spalding has drawn attention to the continuing abasement of the majority population in Peru after Independence: 'Political independence did not mean independence for the people regarded as Indians in Peru. Even their legal status remained unchanged for decades after Spain formally recognized the loss of its Andean colony.' The Peruvian elite managed to maintain the internal colonial structure, weakened though it was, after the break with Spain. In spite of their internal divisions, Spanish American elites strove to assert and retain control over the newly created institutions, in order to forestall or counter any disturbance from lower ethno-social majorities. They were assisted by the fact that no such 'majority' existed in practical terms. On the contrary, the prime factors continued to be local identity, limited focus, and lack of the facility for supra-provincial co-ordination on the part of the distinct communities which composed this 'majority'. In the Peruvian case, Florencia Mallon has shown how brutal government repression of the Tupac Amaru rebellion of the early 1780s and the Cuzco Rebellion of 1814–15 had a lasting effect on the local intelligentsia and on village leaders. As a result, 'when independence occurred in Peru, it was essentially a top-down affair, orchestrated from outside by the armies of José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar'. The military repression of the Brazilian provincial and lower-class uprisings of the 1830s and 1840s illustrated very well elite capacity for survival when the fabric of the new state appeared to be under threat from below. In this respect, the new 'nation-states' were created in the aftermath of far-reaching social and political convulsions during the broader period from the 1770s to the 1870s, and were frequently negative responses to that.

Of the three great revolutionary movements of the western world in the period from 1776 to 1826, two took place in the Americas. The British North American, the French, and Ibero-American revolutions were not identical or derivative, but together they revealed the dimension of change that took place, not least of which was the scale of republican triumph. All three movements came from different historical contexts. Bolívar in his Angostura Address of 1819 strongly emphasised the distinct political cultures of British North America and Spanish America.


principally with regard to the absence of comparable representative institutions in the latter. The Ibero-American revolutions differed markedly from those of British North America and France in their origins and results. The USA, for instance, was able to construct a viable constitutional system which involved the regular transfer of power through elections. In Ibero-America, only New Granada (Colombia after 1863) and Chile were able to do so, but in completely different contexts. Elite primacy in Ibero-America generally managed to abort any revolutionary tradition that might have emerged with the struggles for Independence. Virtually nowhere in Ibero-America, with the possible exception of Mexico, did a vibrant revolutionary tradition, comparable to that of nineteenth-century France, thrive.